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Wolnick: A Privacy Right in Text Messages

CASE SUMMARY

THE EXTENSION OF PRIVACY
RIGHTS TO WORKPLACE
TEXT MESSAGES UNDER
QUON V. ARCH WIRELESS
INTRODUCTION
In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a public employer
violated the Fourth Amendment by searching the contents of text
messages sent and received on a public employee's work-issued pager. I
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit found that the public employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the text messages,
despite a formal Internet and computer policy stating otherwise. 2
Relying on the two-part 0 'Connor test for public-employer searches, the
court found that the search was more intrusive than necessary to
determine whether the messages were work-related or personal. 3 The
Ninth Circuit also held that a wireless text-messaging provider violated
the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") when it released the contents
of archived text messages without the consent of the addressee or
.,
4
recIpIent.

I Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
21d.

3 1d. at 908-09; see O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). The O'Connor test asks
whether a public employer's intrusion into a government employee's constitutionally protected
privacy interest was reasonable at its inception and in its scope under all of the circumstances. Id. at

726.
4

Quon, 529 F.3d at 903.
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1. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In late 2002, the internal affairs department of the City of Ontario
Police Department ("OPD") investigated Sergeant Jeffrey Quon due to
overages of his allotted characters on his city-provided text-messaging
pager. Sergeant Quon, and others who sent and received messages from
him, claimed that the review of their text messages violated the Fourth
Amendment, the California Constitution, and the SCA. 5 Sergeant Quon
exchanged text messages with his wife, Jerilyn Quon, another OPD
officer, Sergeant Trujillo, and one of the OPD's dispatchers, April
Florio. 6
In 2001, the City of Ontario ("City") contracted with Arch Wireless
("Arch") for wireless text-messaging services. 7 Sergeant Quon was one
of the employees who received a pager from the OPD. 8 Each employee
was allotted 25,000 characters for text messaging per month. 9 Sergeant
Quon exceeded this monthly allotment three or four times prior to
August 2002. 10 In each month that he went over the allotted characters,
he paid for the overages at the request of Lieutenant Duke, the officer in
charge of the purchasing contract with Arch. II
The OPD's general "Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy"
stated that computer use for personal benefit is a significant violation of
the policy and that users have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using work computers, the Internet, or e-mailing at
work. 12 Lieutenant Duke testified that he had a meeting with Sergeant
Quon after the first month of overages and confirmed that Sergeant Quon
knew the computer, e-mail, and Internet policy applied to the pagers. 13
Sergeant Quon testified that he did not remember having that
conversation with Lieutenant Duke. 14 However, the parties did not
dispute that Sergeant Quon attended a meeting in April 2002, during
which Lieutenant Duke told everyone present that the pager messages
were considered e-mail and that the policy applied to those messages. 15

5

6

7
8

Id. at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id.

I d. at 897.
10Id.
9

"Id.
12 Id. at 896, 906.
13 Id. at 896.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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In August 2002, Sergeant Quon again exceeded the monthly textmessaging character allowance. 16 After Lieutenant Duke expressed
annoyance with being a "bill collector" for the overages, Chief Lloyd
Scharf asked him to determine whether the overages were work-related,
so that the OPD could increase the monthly allowance if needed!7
Lieutenant Duke requested transcripts of text messages to and from
Sergeant Quon and several other employees. IS Arch confirmed the pager
numbers and delivered copies of the text-message transcripts to
Lieutenant Duke, who reported his initial findings to Chief Scharf. 19
Chief Scharf also reviewed the transcripts with Sergeant Quon's
supervisor. 2o
After reviewing the transcripts, Chief Scharf asked internal affairs
to investigate whether Sergeant Quon was wasting City time by failing to
do required work. 2I The internal affairs investigators concluded that
Sergeant Quon had a monthly overage of 15,158 characters, and that
many of the messages were not work-related and "often sexually
explicit. ,,22
The plaintiffs sued the City, the OPD, Chief Scharf, and Debbie
Glenn of the OPD's Internal Affairs. The plaintiffs based their claims on
the Stored Communications Act; article I, section 1, of the California
Constitution; and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 23 The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on each of
these claims, and the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion in ful1. 24
The defendants also moved for summary judgment, which the district
court granted in part and denied in part. 25
First, the district court found as a matter of law that Arch did not
violate the SCA when it released the text-message transcripts to the
City.26 Second, the district court found as a matter of law that the
plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of the
text messages, but that there was a triable issue of material fact regarding
ld. at 897.
ld. at 897-98.
18 ld. at 898.
19 ld.
20 ld.
16

17

21 ld. Internal Affairs investigated the text messaging of the employees who had the most
overages. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 2009) (Wardlaw, 1.,
concurring in denial ofreh'g en banc).
22 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2008).
23 ld.
24 ld.
2S
26

ld.
!d.
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whether the government's search was reasonable under the
circumstances. 27 The jury found that Chief Scharf's intent was to
determine the reason for the overages. Based on this finding of fact, the
trial court determined the search was reasonable?8 Lastly, the district
court held as a matter of law that Chief Scharf was not entitled to
qualified immunity against the claims of Fourth Amendment violations,
and that the City and the OPD were not entitled to statutory immunity
against the claims of violations of the California Constitution?9
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's findings regarding
Arch's violation of the SCA and the reasonableness of the OPD's
search. 3o However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's findings
regarding the City's and OPD's statutory immunity.3! The defendants'
petition for rehearing en bane was denied. 32
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

A. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLA nONS

The plaintiffs claimed that their privacy rights were violated when
the City, the OPD, Chief Scharf, and Sergeant Glenn of internal affairs
requested and received copies of the text-message transcripts. 33 Both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit noted that the privacy interest
protected by the California Constitution is no broader than the privacy
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 34 Thus the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the privacy claims proceeded under the Fourth Amendment. 35
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that all of the
plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the
text messages. 36 It reiterated the principle that if a public employee has a
reasonable expectation in the area searched, the governmental intrusion
into that area must be reasonable at its inception and in its scope. 37
27

[d. at 899.

28

[d.

29

[d.

30

[d. at 909-10.

31/d.

Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2009).
[d. at 903.
34 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1,30 n.9, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
35 [d.
32

33

36

[d. at 906.

37

[d. at 904 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987».
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However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's finding
that the search was reasonable. 38

1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Content of the Text
Messages
The court found that plaintiffs Jerilyn Quon, Florio, and Trujillo had
a reasonable expectation that no third party would intercept and read the
text messages. 39 The court analogized the text messages to public phone
conversations,4o written letters,41 and e-mails,42 for all of which courts
have found that individuals had reasonable expectations of privacy in the
contents. Moreover, the court found that Arch's ability to access the
information on the devices did not destroy Jerilyn's, Florio's, and
Trujillo's expectation of privacy.43 Privacy existed because they did not
expect Arch to monitor their messages, and they certainly did not expect
Arch to tum over the transcripts of the messages to other people. 44
The court also found that Sergeant Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the content of the text messages,
although his expectation of privacy turned on the OPD's privacy
policies. 45 Despite the existence of the OPD's formal Internet and e-mail
policy, the "operational reality" of the OPD was not in line with the
policy.46 Lieutenant Duke made it clear that he would not audit the

Id. at 908.
1d. at 906.
40 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that a person using a public
phone has a reasonable expectation that the conversation will not be broadcast to the world); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that people "realize that they must 'convey' phone
numbers to the telephone company" and therefore do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the numbers they dial).
41 United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 174 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects a person's privacy in sealed letters and packages addressed to him); United
States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information on the outside of an envelope).
42 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that e-mail users
have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages).
43 Quon, 529 F.3d at 90S.
44 Id., see also U. S. v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
student did not lose his reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer merely because his
university had a policy that it could access his computer in limited circumstances while he was
connected to the university's network); United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189-90 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that an employee had a reasonable expectation in a private computer locked in his
office despite a policy that the employer would monitor computer use).
45 Quon, 529 F.3d at 906.
46 1d. at 907 (quoting a phrase from O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987».
38

39
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pagers as long as the employees agreed to pay for overages. 47 Lieutenant
Duke's statements were found to carry weight in the employees'
formation of reasonable expectations of privacy because it was Duke's
job to administer the pagers, and because there were no audits prior to
the audit of Sergeant Quon's pager.48 Further, Sergeant Quon had
exceeded his character limit three or four times previously without
having his text messages reviewed. 49 Thus, the court determined that
Sergeant Quon relied on the OPD's informal policy rather than its
official policy in forming his reasonable expectation of privacy. 50
2. Unreasonable Search a/the Text-Message Transcripts

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the search
of Sergeant Quon's text messages was reasonable. 51 Instead, the Ninth
Circuit held that although the search was reasonable at its inception, it
became unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of its legitimate
purpose. 52
The Ninth Circuit held that a search is reasonable in scope when the
method of the search is reasonably related to its purpose. 53 The court
applied the "least intrusive means" test because the search was conducted
by a public employer: a public employer's search of a governmental
employee's work place is unreasonable if there are alternate means that
are less intrusive. 54 According to the court, the OPD could have
determined the appropriateness of the character limits in several ways
other than reviewing the text-message transcripts. 55
The court suggested that the OPD could have 1) warned Sergeant
Quon that he was not allowed to use his pager for personal messages for
the month of September; 2) asked Sergeant Quon to count the characters
himself; or 3) asked Sergeant Quon's permission to review the transcripts

I d. at 907.
I d.
49
Id.
50 Id. at 907-08.
47

48

The defendants argued that Lieutenant Duke's statements could not be
relied upon because he was not an official policy maker. The defendants also argued that under the
California Public Records Act, public records are open to inspection at all times. Both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. The jury found that Chief Scharf's intent was to determine the reason for the overages,
which is a legitimate, work-related purpose for the search. Id.
53 Id. at 908 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987».
54 Id. (citing Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1987).
55 Id.
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after Sergeant Quon had redacted personal messages. 56 In light of these
less intrusive means of searching, the court determined that the search
was excessively intrusive for a non-investigatory search. 57 Therefore, the
court concluded, the search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 58
B. VIOLATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that Arch
Wireless was a "remote computing service" (RCS) under the SCA. 59
Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that Arch Wireless was an "electronic
communication service" (ECS).60 The court also held that because Arch
was an ECS, it violated the SCA by knowingly releasing the textmessage transcripts to the City.61
An RCS provides the public with "computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communications system. ,,62 An ECS
is "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications. ,,63 Arch argued that it should
be classified as an RCS because it permanently stored the text-message
communications on its system and thus provided storage services. 64
However, under the SCA, an ECS may store data as well. An ECS may
temporarily store data incidental to the communication or provide
storage for backup protection. 65
The Ninth Circuit rejected Arch's argument because there was no
evidence that Arch stored the communication permanently for the City's
use; instead, it simply "archived" the messages on its own server. 66 The
court found that the definition of an ECS more adequately describes the
services Arch provided to the City, because it did not provide "computer
storage" or "processing services," but text-messaging pager services. 67 It
acted as a conduit of electronic communications, and it stored those

1d.
Id. at 909.
58 Id. at 903.
59 1d. at 901.
60 Id. at 900.
61 1d. at 903.
56

57

62
63
64

65
66
67

18 V.S.C.A. § 2711(2) (Westlaw 2009).
18 V.S.C.A. § 2510(15) (Westlaw 2009).
Quon, 529 F.3d at 902.
Quon, 529 F.3d at 901; see 18 V.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (Westlaw 2009).
Quon, 529 F.3d at 902-903.
Id. at 90 I.
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communications as backup for the user.68
The court further supported its finding that Arch was an ECS by
looking to the SCA's legislative history.69 The Senate Report identified
two types of electronic services: 1) data communication, and 2) data
storage and processing. 7o Businesses offering either type of service
create copies of private messages for later reference. 7 ( However, an RCS
processes or stores data as an off-site third party,72 while an ECS
facilitates communications between two other parties. 73 Although an
RCS uses electronic communications, those communications most often
involve transmitting data between the RCS and its customers, not
between two users as would be the case with an ECS. 74
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit relied on its findings in Theofel v. FareyJones, a case that dealt with stored e-mail communications. 75 In Theofel,
the Ninth Circuit concluded the defendant, NetGear, stored e-mail on its
server after the messages were delivered to the intended recipient. 76
These communications were stored for backup protection. 77 Like
NetGear, Arch served as a conduit of electronic communications from
one user to another, and Arch stored the text messages for backup
protection. 78
The distinction between an RCS and an ECS is important because it
determines whether a service may release private information. 79 An RCS
may release a private communication to a third party with the lawful
consent of a subscriber, originator, addressee or intended recipient. 80 An
ECS may only release a private communication to a third party with the
lawful consent of the originator, addressee or intended recipient. 8( Arch,
if classified as an RCS, could have released the text-message transcripts
to the City with the plaintiffs' permission, or with the City's own
68
69

Id. at 902.
Id. at 90 I.

71

Id. (citing S. REp. No. 99-541, at 2-3 (1986».
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3).

72

/d.

70

See id. ("Arch Wireless provided a 'service' that enabled Quon and the other Appellants to
'send or receive ... electronic communications,' i.e., text messages.").
74 Id. at 902 (citing S. REp. No. 99-541, at 10-11) (explaining that hospitals and banks often
use an off-site data repository provided by an RCS to store medical or fmancial files and may submit
the data via electronic communications).
75 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
76 Quon, 529 F.3d at 902 (citing Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075).
73

77

78
79

80
81

Id.
Id .

See id. at 900.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(3) (Westlaw 2009).
Id.
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pennission. 82
But as an ECS, Arch could release the private
communications only with the permission of the sender or recipient of
each communication. 83 Thus, Arch violated the SCA when it released
the transcripts to the City without the permission of any of the plaintiffs.
C. IMMUNITY
The district court held that Chief Scharf was not entitled to qualified
immunity as a matter of law. 84 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that
Chief Scharf was entitled to qualified immunity from liability for
violations of federal and state constitutional privacy rights because no
privacy right had been clearly established that would notify Chief Scharf
that his conduct was unlawful. 85 At the time Chief Scharf performed the
search, the law was clear that a public employee is free from
unreasonable searches in the workplace. 86 However, there was no clear
law establishing whether users have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in archived text messages. 87
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the City
and OPD were not protected by statutory immunity against the California
constitutional claim. 88 A public employee is not liable for injury caused
by "instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding
within the scope of his employment.,,89 The policy behind the statute is
to encourage fearless investigation and prosecution of matters within the
scope of the public employee's purview. 90
The Ninth Circuit held that such a purpose is not served in a case
like the search of Sergeant Quon' s text messages, because this
investigation could not have led to a judicial or administrative
proceeding. 91 Misconduct was a prerequisite for any formal proceeding
against Sergeant Quon.92 However, the OPD's informal policy allowed
employees to use the pagers for personal messages, and it allowed them

82 Quon, 529 F.3d at 900. There was no dispute that the City was a subscriber and not an
addressee or intended recipient. Id.
83
1d.

Id. at 899.
1d. at 909.
86 1d. at 909-10.
87 !d. at 910.
88
1d.
84
85

CAL. GOV. CODE § 821.6 (Westlaw 2009).
Quon, 529 F.3d at 910.
91
1d.
92
1d.
89

90
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to exceed the 25,000 character limit. 93 Under this informal policy, none
of Sergeant Quon's actions could have been deemed misconduct.
Therefore, the City's and OPD's search was not within the scope of the
statutory immunity. 94
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The unanimous Ninth Circuit panel decision in Quon v. Arch
Wireless expands the realm of privacy rights into a new form of
electronic communication: text messaging. However, the search in Quon
was a workplace search. Privacy expectations are often lower in the
workplace than in personal life, partly due to employers' computer and
Internet privacy policies. This lower privacy expectation is especially
true in public employment, due to transparency laws. 95 The Ninth
Circuit's finding that a public employee has a reasonable privacy
expectation in an employer-issued text-messaging device indicates that
the Ninth Circuit is likely to find a privacy interest in the contents of
personal text messages, whether sent and received on a work-related or
personal device.
To help define the scope of privacy in the work place, employers
should update their Internet and e-mail policies. The Ninth Circuit
decision in Quon came as a surprise to some, spurring several articles
advising employers to update their electronic communication privacy
policies. 96 But the Quon outcome should not have come as that much of
a surprise in light of decisions in other circuits, which apply the Fourth
Amendment to electronic communications on other devices, such as cell
93

94

Id. at 897.
I d. at 910.

9S The California Public Records Act is an example. See CAL.GOV. CODE § 6250 et seq.
(Westlaw 2009).
96 See, e.g., Brian Kane, It's Not Your Blackberry: The Courts Remind Employers To Update
Their Workplace Electronics Policies, 51 ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 21 (Oct. 2008) (,This article
underscores the need to dust off electronic usage policies for an overhaul, in light of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Quon"); Mark E. Schreiber & Barbara A. Lee, New
Liabilities and Policies for Incidental Private Use of Company Electronic Systems and PDAs, 52
BOSTON B. J. II, 12 (Dec. 2008) (noting the common practice of employers allowing employees to
use work-place internet and e-mail systems for personal use, but monitoring that use, as well as
discussing how to use Quon to help adjust an employer's monitoring practices); Peter Brown,
Developing Corporate Policies for Information Security and Privacy: Some Key Issues, 929 PLUPAT
439, 450-51 (Mar. - Apr. 2008) (commenting on the legal uncertainties regarding employer and
employee rights for e-mail monitoring in the workplace, while focusing on the potential liabilities to
the employer for an employee's abuse of e-mail); William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To
Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y 1.49,77 (2008) (noting that
the OPD in Quon did not promulgate a formal pager-use policy, but instead relied on an informal
policy, which did not effectively limit the scope of privacy for the pagers).
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phones. 97 Both private and public employers can learn from these cases
in drafting and implementing their Internet and e-mail policies. As the
OPD discovered in Quon, employers must not only ensure that
employees understand what communications are covered under the email policy, but they must also consistently enforce that policy as well. 98
As technology outstrips the current legislation (mainly the SCA and
the Electronic Consumers Protection Act [ECPA)),99 the need for
Congress to readdress the issues presented in Quon and other
technology-search cases becomes more obvious. 100 In Quon, the Ninth
Circuit pointed out that the purpose of the SCA is to deal with a "host of
potential privacy breaches that the Fourth Amendment does not
address." 10 1 However, the ECPA was enacted in 1986, well before the
existence of many technologies taken for granted in today's
workplace. 102
Consumer groups such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation have been advocating privacy in technology on two fronts.
First, these groups are advocating more comprehensive protection
statutes. 103 Second, they are litigating issues with particular technologies
and their individual problems case-by-case. With the efforts of these
consumer groups and with the heightened public attention to the federal
warrantless wiretapping program, it is likely that Congress will soon
reconsider privacy laws in an attempt to deal with new innovations in
technology.

HEATHER WOLNICK·

97 Quon, 529 F.3d at 905 (citing with approval United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259
(5th Cir. 2007), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the content of a cell phone text message is
protected by the Fourth Amendment).
98 [d. at 906 (holding that the OPD's informal policy regarding use of the pagers gave
Sergeant Quon a reasonable expectation in the messages).
99 Electronic Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508,100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
100 James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections To Keep
Pace with Technology, 935 PLIIPat 543,547 (2008).
101 Quon, 529 F.3d at 900.
102 Dempsey, supra note 101, at 547.
103 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy (last visited Apr. 13,
2009); American Civil Liberties Union Homepage, http://www.aclu.com/privacy/index.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2009) .
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